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cially durable consumption and residential investment) rises on impact and rises further with a lag. Thus, after a year or two, the response to our estimated technology series more or less matches the predictions of the standard, frictionless RBC model. But the short-run effects do not.
Correcting for unobserved input utilization (labor effort and capital's workweek) is central to understanding the relationship between procyclical TFP and countercyclical purified technology. Utilization is a form of primary input. Our estimates imply that when technology improves, unobserved utilization, as well as observed inputs, fall sharply on impact. Both then recover with a lag. In other words, when technology improves, utilization falls-so TFP initially rises less than technology does.
Of course, if technology shocks were the only impulse-and if, as we estimate, these shocks were negatively correlated with the cycle-then even before controlling for utilization, we would still be likely to observe a negative correlation between uncorrected TFP and the business cycle. Demand shocks can explain why, instead, uncorrected TFP is procyclical. When demand increases, output and inputs-including unobserved utilization-increase as well. We find that nontechnology shocks are important enough at cyclical frequencies for changes in utilization to make uncorrected TFP procyclical.
To identify technology, we use tools from Basu and Fernald (1997) and Basu and Kimball (1997) , who in turn build on Solow (1957) and Robert E. Hall (1990) . Basu and Fernald stress the role of sectoral heterogeneity and aggregation. They argue that for economically plausible reasons-for example, differences across industries in the degrees of market power-the marginal product of an input may differ across uses. The aggregate Solow residual (growth in aggregate TFP) then depends on which sectors change input use the most over the business cycle. Basu and Kimball stress the role of variable capital and labor utilization. Their basic insight is that a cost-minimizing firm operates on all margins simultaneously, both observed and unobserved. Hence, changes in observed inputs can proxy for unobserved utilization changes. For example, if labor is particularly valuable, firms will tend to work existing employees both longer (observed hours per worker rise) and harder (unobserved effort rises).
Together, these two papers imply that one can construct an index of aggregate technology change by "purifying" sectoral Solow residuals and then aggregating across sectors. Thus, our fundamental identification comes from estimating sectoral production functions.
Jordi Gall (1999a) independently proposes a quite different method to investigate similar issues. Following Olivier J. Blanchard and Danny Quah (1989) and Matthew D. Shapiro and Mark W. Watson (1988), Gall identifies technology shocks using long-run restrictions in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR). Gall assumes that only technology shocks affect labor productivity in the long run. He examines aggregate data on output and hours worked for a number of countries and, like us, finds that technology shocks reduce input use on impact.
A growing literature questions or defends Galf's (1999a) specification.2 Neville Francis and Valerie A. Ramey (2005) extend Galf's identification scheme and subject it to a range of economic and statistical tests; they conclude that "the original technology-driven real business cycle hypothesis does appear to be dead." Lawrence J. , however, argue for using per capita hours in log-levels rather than in growth rates. With this subtle change in specification, they conclude that technology improvements raise hours worked on impact.3 Thus, although the SVAR evidence mostly suggests that technology improvements reduce hours, the evidence from this approach is not yet conclusive.
Our alternative augmented-growth-accounting approach relies on completely different assumptions for identification, with at least four advantages relative to the SVAR literature. First, our results do not depend on a theoretically derived long-run identifying restriction that might not hold. For example, increasing returns, permanent sectoral shifts, capital taxes, and some models of endogenous growth would all imply that nontechnology shocks can change long-run labor productivity, thus invalidating the identifying assumption.4 Our production-function approach allows these deviations. Second, we can identify transitory as well as permanent technology shocks; the SVAR approach, in contrast, at best identifies only permanent, unit-root technology shocks. Third, even if the longrun restriction holds, it produces well-identified shocks and reliable inferences only with potentially restrictive, atheoretical auxiliary assumptions (see, for example, Jon Faust and Eric M. Leeper, 1997).5 Our production-function approach, by contrast, does not rely on these same identification conditions. Fourth, we can easily look at the effect of technology shocks on a large number of variables; results from an identified VAR might look very different as more variables are added. Nevertheless, we view the identified VAR and augmented-growth-accounting approaches as complements, with distinct identification schemes and strengths.
Two additional approaches also suggest that technology improvements reduce input use. First, estimated structural dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models (for example, Frank Smets and Raf Wouters, 2003, for the euro area and Andrew Levin et al., 2006 , for the United States) often find that technology improvements reduce input use on impact. Second, John Shea (1999) measures technology as innovations to R&D spending and patent activity and finds that with a lag of several years process innovations increase TFP and simultaneously lower labor input.6
Despite differing data, countries, and methods, the bottom line is that the state-of-the-art versions of four very different approaches yield similar results. We thus view the contractionary effect of technology improvements as a robust stylized fact that models need to explain.
What do these results imply for modeling business cycles? They are clearly inconsistent with standard parameterizations of frictionless RBC models, including Robert G. King and Sergio T. Rebelo's (1999) attempt to "resuscitate" these models. The negative effect of a technology improvement on nonresidential investment is particularly hard to reconcile with flexible-price RBC models (including the models suggested by Francis and Ramey, 2003) , given our finding that technology appears to be a random walk. Our findings are consistent, however, with the predictions of DGE models with sticky prices. Consider the quantity-theory case where output is proportional to real balances. In the short run, if the supply of money is fixed and prices cannot adjust, then real balances and hence output are also fixed. Now suppose technology improves. Firms now need fewer inputs to produce this unchanged output, so they lay off workers and desire less capital, which could reduce investment.7 Over time, however, prices adjust, the underlying RBC dynamics take over, and output rises. Relaxing the quantity-theory assumption allows for richer dynamics for output (which could even decline) and its components, but doesn't change the basic message. Models where price rigidity arises endogenously from imperfect common knowledge, as in Michael Woodford (2003a), make similar predictions (see Takuji Kawamoto,  2004) .
Of course, in a sticky-price model, technology improvements will be contractionary only if the monetary authority does not offset their short-run effects through expansionary monetary policy. After all, standard sticky-price models predict that a technology improvement that increases full-employment output creates a short-run disinflation, which gives the monetary authority room to lower interest rates. In Section V, we argue that technology improvements are still likely to be contractionary, reflecting The paper has the following structure. Section I reviews our method for identifying sectoral and aggregate technology change. Section II discusses data and econometric method. Section III presents our main empirical results. Section IV discusses robustness. Section V presents alternative interpretations of our results, including our preferred sticky-price interpretation. Section VI concludes.
I. Estimating Aggregate Technology, Controlling for Utilization
We identify aggregate technology by estimating (instrumented) a Hall-style regression equation with a proxy for utilization in each disaggregated industry. We then define aggregate technology change as an appropriately weighted sum of the resulting residuals. Section IA discusses our augmented Solow-Hall approach and aggregation; Section IB discusses how we control for utilization.
A. Industry and Aggregate Technology
We assume each industry has a production function for gross output:
(1) Yi = Fi(AiKi, EiHiNi, Mi, Zi)" The industry produces gross output, Yi, using the capital stock Ki, employees Ni, and intermediate inputs of energy and materials Mi. We assume that the capital stock and number of employees are quasi-fixed, so their levels cannot be changed costlessly. But industries may vary the intensity with which they use these quasi-fixed inputs: Hi is hours worked per employee; Ei is the effort of each worker; and Ai is the capital utilization rate (that is, capital's workweek). Total labor input, Li, is the product EiHiNi. The production function F' is (locally) homogeneous of arbitrary degree yi in total inputs; y, exceeding one implies increasing returns to scale, reflecting overhead costs, decreasing marginal cost, or both; Zi indexes technology.
Following Hall (1990), we assume cost minimization and relate output growth to the growth rate of inputs. The standard first-order conditions give us the necessary output elasticities, i.e., the weights on growth of each input.9 Let dxi be observed input growth, and dui be unobserved growth in utilization. (For any variable J, we define dj as its logarithmic growth rate In(Jt/Jt ).) This yields: Utilization growth, dui, is a weighted sum of growth in capital utilization, Ai, and labor effort, Ei. Since cost-minimizing firms operate on all margins simultaneously, changes in observed inputs can potentially proxy for unobserved utilization changes. We derive such a relationship from the cost-minimization conditions of the representative firm within each industry, following Basu and Kimball (1997) . The model below provides microfoundations for a simple proxy: changes in hours-per-worker are proportional to unobserved changes in both labor effort and capital utilization. We assume only that firms minimize cost and are pricetakers in factor markets; we do not require any assumptions about firms' pricing and output behavior in the goods market. In addition, we do not assume that we observe the firm's internal shadow prices of capital, labor, and output at high frequencies.
We model firms as facing adjustment costs to investment and hiring, so that capital (number of machines and buildings), K, and employment (number of workers), N, are both quasi-fixed. One needs quasi-fixity for a meaningful model of variable factor utilization. Higher utilization must raise firms' costs, or they would always utilize factors fully. Given these costs, if firms could costlessly change the rate of investment or hiring, they would always keep utilization at its long-run cost-minimizing level and vary inputs by hiring/firing workers and capital. Thus, only if it is costly to adjust capital and labor is it sensible to pay the costs of varying utilization."
We assume that firms can freely vary A, E, and H without adjustment cost. We assume the major cost of increasing capital utilization, A, is that firms pay a shift premium (a higher wage) to compensate employees for working at night or other undesirable times. We take A to be a continuous variable for simplicity, although discrete variations in capital's workday (the number of shifts) are an important mechanism for varying utilization.12 When firms increase labor utilization, E, they must compensate workers for the increased disutility of effort with a higher wage. High-frequency fluctuations in this wage might be unobserved if an implicit contract governs wage payments in a long-term relationship. 10 This weighting scheme follows Evsey Domar (1961 Note that uncertainty does not affect our derivations, which rely only on intra-temporal optimization equations. Uncertainty affects the evolution of the state variables (as the Euler equations would show) but not the minimization of variable cost at a point in time, conditional on the levels of the state variables.
Equations (11) and (12) can be combined into an equation implicitly relating E and H:
HGH(H, E) EGE(H, E) (13) G(H, E) = G(H, E)
The elasticities of labor costs with respect to H and E must be equal because, in terms of benefits, elasticities of effective labor input with respect to H and E are equal. Given the assumptions on G, (13) implies a unique, upward-sloping E-H expansion path: E = E(H), E'(H) > 0. That is, we can express unobserved intensity of labor utilization E as a function of observed hours per worker H. We define ~-H*E'(H*)/E(H*) as the elasticity of effort with respect to hours, evaluated at the steady state. Log-linearizing, we find:
To find a proxy for capital utilization, we combine (10) and (11). Rearranging, we find: FI AK/F G(H, E) AV'(A) ( 
15) F2EHN/F LHGH(H, E)J V(A)
The left-hand side is a ratio of output elasticities. As in Hall (1990) , cost minimization implies that they are proportional to factor cost shares, which we denote by aK and aL. Define 
B. Estimating Technology Change
We estimate industry-level technology change from the 29 regression residuals from (18), estimated as a system of equations. To conserve parameters, we restrict the utilization coefficient within three groups: durables manufacturing (11 industries, listed in Table 1 In addition, results are robust to using (unconstrained) industry-by-industry estimation, either by 2SLS or LIML. Parameter estimates are less precise and more variable with individual than group estimation, but median estimates are similar to the median GMM estimates. Estimating individual equations raises the variance of estimated aggregate technology but does not change our main conclusions.
III. Results

A. Estimates and Summary Statistics
Our main focus is the aggregate effects of technology shocks, estimated as an appropriately weighted average of industry regression residuals. Table 1 summarizes the underlying industry parameter estimates from equation (19). For durable manufacturing, the median returns-to-scale estimate is 1.07; for nondurable manufacturing, 0.89; for nonmanufacturing, 1.10. For all 29 industries shown, the median estimate is 1.00. (Omitting hours-per-worker growth raises the overall median estimate of returns to scale to 1.12). After correcting for variable utilization, there is thus little overall evidence of increasing returns, although there is wide variation across industries.17 Throwing out "outlier" industries (lumber, textiles, chemicals, leather, electric utilities, FIRE, and services) has little effect on results below.
The coefficient on hours-per-worker, in the bottom panel, is strongly statistically significant in durables and nondurables manufacturing.
The coefficient is significant at the 10-percent level in nonmanufacturing. Table 2 summarizes means and standard deviations for TFP (the Solow residual) and "purified" technology. TFP does not adjust for utilization or nonconstant returns. Purified technology controls for utilization and nonconstant returns, aggregated as in equation (5).
For the entire private nonmining economy, the standard deviation of technology, 1.5 percent per year, compares with the 2.0-percent standard deviation of TFP; indeed, the variance is only 55 percent as high. For both durable and nondurable manufacturing, the standard deviation of purified technology is, perhaps surprisingly, higher than for TFP. The reduction in variance in column 1 comes primarily from reducing the (substantial) positive covariance across industries, consistent with the notion that business cycle factors-common demand shocks-lead to positively correlated changes in utilization and TFP across industries.
Some simple plots summarize the comovement in our data. We summarize dynamics with regressions and with impulse responses from small bivariate (near) VARs. To begin, the level of purified technology (i.e., cumulated growth rates) appears to have a unit root. With an augmented 18 Corrections to all three groups-manufacturing durables, manufacturing nondurables, and nonmanufacturing-contribute to the negative correlation, although adjustments to manufacturing appear most important. For example, if we simply use TFP in nonmanufacturing rather than estimated technology, the correlation with aggregate hours is -0.33.
19 As Basu and Fernald (1997) discuss, one reallocation effect comes from the difference in returns to scale between durable and nondurable manufacturing. Durables industries tend to have higher estimated returns to scale (see Table 1 small. Thus, in what follows, we assume technology change is a random walk. Table 3 shows results from regressing a wide range of variables on four lags of technology shocks. (Since purified technology is close to white noise, using more or fewer lags has little effect on coefficients shown.)20 Purified technology is a generated regressor, so correct standard errors must account for the estimation error involved in estimating technology from the underlying data and the "first step" parameter estimates. As is typical with generated regressors, the correction depends on the true coefficient on technology as well as the first-step estimation error; but if the true coefficient is zero, then the usual standard errors are correct. The standard errors in Table 3 assume the null that the true coefficient is zero.21 20 We interpret our technology shocks as fundamental shocks to the vector moving-average representation of each series. Assuming orthogonality with other fundamental shocks (an assumption not imposed for identification), the coefficients are consistent. We report (Newey-West) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors. For most variables, minimizing the Akaike or Schwartz Bayesian Information Criteria suggests two lags, at most. The regressions show more lags for completeness, since adding them has little impact on the dynamics at zero to two lags. 21 More subtly, however, we want to test the sign of the impact-effect coefficient. In particular, we must reject not only the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero but also that it is positive. In principle, sufficiently large "first-step" estimation error could cause us to reject a true coefficient of zero but not reject that the true coefficient is some positive number. The on-line Appendix derives a simple test statistic that allows us to reject this possibility. Hence, if we can reject the null hypothesis of zero, we can also reject the null hypothesis that the true coefficient has the opposite sign from the one reported.
In Table 3 , the first row shows that in response to a technology shock, output growth changes little on impact but rises strongly with a lag of one and two years. Output growth is flat in year three, but below normal in year four, possibly reflecting a reversal of transient business cycle effects.
The second row summarizes one of the two key points of this paper: When technology improves, total hours worked fall very sharply on impact. The decline is statistically significant. In the year after the technology improvement, hours recover sharply. The increase in hours continues into the second year.
Total observed inputs (cost-share-weighted growth in capital and labor), row 3, and utilization, row 4, show a similar pattern. Note that utilization recovers more quickly but less persistently. In particular, after the initial decline, utilization rises sharply with a one-year lag but is flat with two lags, even as hours continue to rise. Economically, this pattern makes sense. The initial response of labor input during a recovery reflects increased intensity (existing employees work longer and harder). As the recovery continues, however, rising labor input hours reflects primarily new hiring rather than increased intensity. Thus, one would expect utilization to peak before total hours worked or employment. Indeed, line 5 shows that employment recovers more weakly with one lag than does total hours worked. With two lags, however, as utilization levels off, total hours worked continue to rise because of the increase in employment.
The results for utilization explain the phaseshift in Figure 2 . On impact, when technology rises, utilization falls. Measured TFP depends (in part) on technology plus the change in utilization; the technology improvement raises TFP, but the fall in utilization reduces it. Hence, on impact TFP rises less than the full increase in technology. With a one-year lag, utilization increases, which in turn raises TFP.
In sum, the estimates imply that, on impact, both observed inputs and utilization fall. These declines about offset the increase in technology, leaving output little changed. With a lag of a year, observed inputs, utilization, and output recover strongly. With a lag of two years, observed output and inputs (notably the number of employees) continue to increase whereas utilization is flat.
The bottom five rows show selected expenditure categories from the national accounts. Row 7 shows the second key point of this paper: on impact, nonresidential investment falls very sharply; with a lag of one and two years, nonresidential investment rises sharply. Thus, the response of nonresidential investment looks qualitatively similar to the response of total hours worked.
In contrast, residential investment plus consumer durables purchases rises strongly on impact, then rises further with a lag. The different response of business and household investment is not surprising. Nonresidential investment is driven by the need for capital in production, whereas the forces driving residential investment and purchases of consumer durables are more closely connected to the forces driving consumption generally. Consumption of nondurables and services rises slightly but not significantly on impact and then rises further (and significantly) with one and two lags. Note that we are largely identifying one-time permanent shocks to the level of technology. Thus, our shocks raise permanent income (though not expected future growth in permanent income). We therefore expect that consumption should rise in response, although habit formation or consumption-labor complementarity, combined with the effects of long-run interest rates, could explain the initial muted response.
The final two rows show the response of inventories and net exports; in both cases, we scale the level by GDP. The inventory/GDP ratio falls significantly; net exports/GDP rises, but insignificantly. These are interesting because, when technology improves, firms could potentially use these margins to smooth production, even if they don't plan to sell more output today. Figure 3 plots impulse responses to a 1-percent technology improvement for the quantity variables discussed above. Although we could simply plot cumulative responses from the regressions in Table 3, Figure 3 are generally similar to the regression results. At longer horizons, the impulse responses suggest that output rises about 1.5 times as much as technology; hours, employment, and total inputs rise a bit (but not significantly) relative to pre-shock levels; utilization returns close to its pre-shock level; measured TFP rises almost one for one with technology; and the level of household spending rises. The standard error on nonresidential investment is too large to make any definite statement about its longrun behavior. 
C. Dynamics of Prices and Interest Rates
IV. Robustness Checks
We now address robustness. We report a range of VAR specifications and Granger-causality tests; put purified technology into a longrun structural VAR; and look at the industry technology shocks themselves. The on-line Appendix discusses econometric issues of input measurement error and small-sample properties of instrumental variables. Our basic finding that input use and investment covary negatively with technology is robust.
A. Alternative VAR Specifications and Granger Causality
Reported results are affected little if, instead of taking our technology series as white noise, we allow the series to be autoregressive and/or allow shocks to variable J to affect technology with a lag (e.g., if we use the standard ordering identification in a VAR). Nevertheless, our procedure doesn't require strict exogeneity of technology (so that dz, is independent of other shocks at time 7, where 7 need not equal t). Our identification does require that our instruments not be correlated contemporaneously with true technology. But suppose, for example, that an expansionary money (interest rate) shock leads firms to cut back on R&D, which reduces future technology growth; dz, then depends on past monetary shocks, which would Granger-cause technology. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the lags are longer than a year, so that our identification assumption still holds. That said, we find no evidence that any of the other variables we examine Granger-causes technology.24 then the estimated error term contains (y, -y)dx. Countercyclical y, implies that this extra term is always negative, so the main effect is on the constant term rather than the cyclicality of the residual. Note also that Shapiro and Watson (1988) argue against using TFP growth, since it is naturally defined in first differences, as is our purified technology dz. In particular, the long-run restriction would label as technology any classical measurement error. Thus, the long-run VAR will not clean out all sources of misspecification.
B. Long-Run Restrictions
See Christiano et al. (2003) for details of estimation.
We thank Robert Vigfusson for providing the computer code used to calculate confidence intervals in that paper. ference specification) with our original purified technology series. Estimating the VAR with a 1973 trend-break in productivity brings both correlations to about 0.9. When we define PR as aggregate labor productivity (following Gal, 1999a), including the trend break, the correlation of the resulting technology series with our purified series is 0.78 (levels) or 0.75 (differences). (Using annual BLS data on nonfarm business labor productivity and hours per capita, the correlations between our purified technology series and the identified technology shocks in both the levels and difference specifications are about 0.6.) Thus, it is clear that we are identifying a similar shock.
Given the sensitivity to low-frequency correlations discussed in Fernald (2005) 
C. One-and Two-Digit Industry Results
Results do not arise from aggregation or due to a small number of industries. For our 29 industries and for 9 (approximately one-digit) industries, Table 4 correlates standard industry TFP and purified technology with inputs and gross output. For all 29 industries, the median correlation of inputs with TFP (Corr(dp, dx)) is 0.15; the median correlation with purified technology (dz) falls to -0.33. The median correlation with output falls from 0.57 (TFP) to 0.01 (technology). Technology covaries negatively with inputs in 24 of the 29 industries.
In results not shown, we also correlated industry technology residuals with SVAR-identifled innovations (identified as in Section IVB, using growth rates of industry labor productivity and hours). The median industry correlation is 0.71; 27 of the 29 correlations are statistically significant (95-percent level). For 22 industries, industry hours fall on impact when SVAR-identified technology improves.
V. Interpretations of the Results
A. The Standard RBC Model
The data show that technology improvements reduce hours and nonresidential investment on impact, while leaving nondurable consumption and output unchanged. By contrast, the standard RBC model (e.g., Cooley and Edward C. Prescott, 1995) predicts that improved technology should raise output, investment, consumption, and labor hours on impact.
Certainly, alternative calibrations of the RBC model could deliver a fall in labor. Technology improvements raise real wages, which has both income and substitution effects. If the income effect dominates, labor input might fall.27 But even with strong income effects, it is unlikely that we would observe the "overshooting" response of hours that we find in the data. The standard RBC model displays monotonic convergence to the steady state, at least in the linearized dynamics. Thus, if hours fall temporarily due to an income effect, they should remain low persistently, and converge to their long-run value from below. Nevertheless, the fall in nonresidential investment most strongly contradicts basic RBC theory. In standard calibrations, a permanent technology improvement increases consumption and investment together.28 Residential investment and consumer durables display the expected pattern, but business investment does not.29
On the other hand, the effects after two to three years are clearly consistent with RBC models: output, investment, consumption, and labor hours are all significantly higher. And the size of the long-run output response is 27 As in Jesper Lind6 (2003), positively autocorrelated technology change could also lead workers to take more leisure initially and work harder in the future, when technology is even better. However, our technology process is not autocorrelated. 28 In an open economy, especially, one can increase imports, so it is easy to increase both consumption and investment.
29 Our estimates also contradict King and Rebelo's (1999) attempt to "resuscitate" the RBC model. By adding variable capital utilization to the basic RBC model, King and Rebelo improve the model's ability to propagate shocks. They use their calibrated model to back out an implied technology series from observed TFP. By construction, their procyclical technology series, however small, drives business cycles. Our empirical work, by contrast, does not impose such a tightly specified model-and the data reject the King and Rebelo model. Hence, their model is not an empirically relevant explanation of business cycles any more than the basic RBC model is. Instead, the main lesson we take from their paper is the importance of utilization as a propagation mechanism, which applies to more realistic models as well. The slow rise of nondurable consumption is broadly consistent with the Francis and Ramey (2005) model, but the investment response is not. In general, although the zero impact effect of technology improvements on output is consistent with their model, the response of output components is not. Empirically, the lack of an immediate output response incorporates sizable jumps in two components of investment, in opposite directions. (Notably, in the first year, nonresidential investment jumps down, while residential investment plus consumer durables purchases jumps up.) These large jumps are not consistent with a model where investment adjustment costs are large.
C. Price Stickiness/Imperfect Common Knowledge
Technology improvements can easily reduce both hours and investment in a sticky-price model. Suppose the quantity theory governs the demand for money and the supply of money is fixed. If prices cannot change in the short run, then neither can real balances or output. Now suppose technology improves. Since the price level is sticky and demand depends on real balances, output does not change in the short run. But firms need fewer inputs to produce this unchanged output, so they lay off workers, reduce hours, and cut back on fixed investment. (To keep private output constant, the sum of the other components of output--consumer durables, residential investment, and nondurables and services-has to increase.) Over time, however, as prices fall, the underlying RBC dynamics take over. Output rises, and the higher marginal product of capital stimulates capital accumulation. Work hours eventually return to their steady-state level.
These effects are present in virtually any sticky-price DGE model when the nominal money supply is held constant, such as Kimball's (1998) neomonetarist model. Kimball (1998) finds that on impact, output could even decline when technology improves, reflecting the decline in business investment. Two effects reduce investment. First, the demand for all inputs declines, including the demand for capital services, resulting in a lower rental rate of capital for any given level of output. Second, if a technology improvement leads to an anticipated decline in the price of investment (as well as other) goods, then firms prefer to hold bonds instead of investing in plant and equipment on which they will take capital losses. Price declines follow this pattern in the data: Figure  4 shows that the price of investment goods falls about 1 percent in the first two years following a 1-percent technology improvement.
How can sticky-price models explain the sharp rise in residential investment and consumer durables purchases, when investment in plant and equipment falls? On the demand side, business demand for capital services depends heavily on current levels of other inputs relative to current capital, and this ratio falls after technology improves. By contrast, household demand for the services of consumer durables and housing depends primarily on permanent income, which rises. On the cost side, residential housing purchases appear to be more sensitive to interest rates than is corporate investment. The federal funds rate falls by about a percentage point in the year that the technology shock occurs (see Figure 4) setting, and reproduce the impact effect of technology improvements that we find in the data.32 Of course, the monetary authority is likely to follow a more realistic feedback rule than simply keeping the nominal money stock constant, as our discussion has assumed so far. Would it accommodate technology improvements by loosening policy, thereby avoiding the initial contraction? In a large class of models where the monetary authority has full information and policy is fully flexible, such an action would be both feasible and optimal. The evidence on the real federal funds rate in Figure 4 suggests that when technology improves, the Federal Reserve does indeed respond by lowering the real fed funds rate. Still, the Fed might not react strongly enough. First, it is hard to be sure in real time that technology has improved. Even if the Fed sees that inflation has fallen for one or two quarters, it might not realize how persistent the effect is. Second, if the Gall et al. (2003) suggest that the contractionary effect on inputs is less pronounced under the Volcker-Greenspan Fed than previously; they hypothesize that monetary policy better accommodated technology improvements in the later period. Table 6 shows regressions where we allow the coefficients on technology (as well as constant terms) to differ by subsample. We include current and two lags of technology. The evidence is mixed: the responses of output and hours are consistent with the hypothesis that monetary policy has become more effective, but the impact decline in nonresidential investment is even larger in the later subperiod. Formal statistical tests for subsample differences, however, do not reject the hypothesis that the responses of the real variables to technology 32 Because Basu's model has few "real rigidities," the contraction is short-lived. Kimball (1995) shows that one can obtain a "contract multiplier" of any desired size by adding real rigidities to the model. Monetary policy can respond only to changes in aggregate technology. Thus, data on firms, where technical change is presumably mostly idiosyncratic, provide a good test of the stickyprice hypothesis. Some recent firm-level evidence does, in fact, link the short-run effects of technology to sticky prices. Domenico Marchetti and Francesco Nucci (2005) apply exactly our identification method to Italian firm-level data and, like us, find that technology improvements reduce input use. But they also have data on the frequency with which firms change prices. They find that technology improvements reduce input use only at firms that have rigid prices. This evidence ties the contractionary result directly to price rigidity. While theory and evidence link contractionary technology improvements to price inflexibility, prices may be rigid for a variety of reasons. The models cited above assume that price changes are time-dependent in an environment with perfect information. But prices may be rigid endogenously in an environment where there are no barriers to changing prices but information is imperfect, as in Woodford (2003a) . Kawamoto (2004) shows that in such a setting, imperfect common knowledge about technology shocks can cause labor input to fall when technology improves. He also emphasizes that models with imperfect information usually do better than perfect-information models with price rigidity at explaining the sluggishness of disinflation after a technology improvement. Imperfect-information models also explain why the Fed does not react more quickly to technology shocks, and thus seem promising candidates to explain many of the results that we find.
D. Sectoral Shifts?
Even with flexible prices, if technology change is uneven across sectors, then output and inputs might temporarily fall because reallocating resources is costly. (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998 , document these costs for capital.) Our data, however, do not appear to support the sectoral-shifts alternative.
Reallocation pressures presumably depend positively on the dispersion of technology shocks. Thus, we add a measure of technology dispersion to our basic regressions and see whether it significantly explains input and output growth.34 A natural dispersion measure, Disp, is the cross-sectional standard deviation in technical progress, 2 where i indexes industries, dzi is the estimated industry technology shock, scaled to be valueadded augmenting as in equation (4), and wi is the sector's value-added weight. 35 It seems unlikely that our technology impulse proxies for dispersion effects, since the two variables are close to uncorrelated. More formally, in Table 7 we regress output growth, various measures of input growth (total inputs, hours, and utilization), and business investment on purified technology along with current and two lagged values of Disp (adding more lags makes little or no difference).
In all cases, adding Disp has relatively little effect on the coefficients, standard errors, and timing patterns of technology and its lags. The addition of the Disp variables leads to only a moderate improvement in the R2 Of the regressions-the increase is between 0.02 and 0.07. Interestingly, with a one-year lag, technology dispersion is associated with lower growth in output, utilization, business investment, and, less significantly, hours and total inputs. The one-year lag 34 David Lilien (1982) , who argues for the importance of sectoral shifts, measures reallocation as the cross-industry variance of employment growth. Our measure does not rigorously test the sectoral shifts alternative, since a common aggregate shock affects optimal input use equally in all sectors only if all production and demand functions are homothetic. Nevertheless, even if imperfect, our measure should capture some of the forces leading to input reallocation. f5 We remove constant terms and trend breaks from industry and aggregate technology before calculating Disp,. Note that dz, is already defined on a value-added basis. makes sense, since the costs of sectoral shifts should be associated primarily with changes in employment, which occur with a lag after a technological impulse. Overall, there is some evidence for a sectoral shift effect, but this effect is more or less orthogonal to the evidence for the direct effect that we attribute to sticky prices. Moreover, the effects of sectoral shifts seem to come after the initial year in which we find the most dramatic contractionary effects.
E. Time to Learn?
Several authors have argued that technological improvements may reduce measured growth for a time, as the economy adjusts to new production methods. For example, Greenwood and Mehmet Yorukoglu (1997) argue that the introduction of the personal computer caused the post-1974 slowdown in economic growth, since workers and firms had to accumulate new human capital. That is, when new technology is introduced, unobserved investment is high; but since the national accounts do not include investments in human (or, in most cases, organizational) capital as output, market output-and hence measured productivity growth-might be low. Therefore, low observed productivity growth is associated with high input growth, because "full" output is mismeasured. Over time, the investment in knowledge does raise measured output and productivity.36
This class of models does not generally predict our results. We do not correct for mismeasured output arising from unobserved investments in knowledge; hence, when technology is introduced, we would conclude (incorrectly) that technology fell. Since measured (as well as unmeasured) inputs are likely to rise at those times, we might find that technology contractions coincide with input expansions. But with a lag, when market output rises, we would measure a technology improvement-coinciding with a boom. Hence, measured technology improvements would appear expansionary. Figure 2 suggests that the negative correlation between measured technology and outputs reflects technology improvements as well as declines (relative to trend), so the time-to-learn story is unlikely to explain our results. 38 There are also other possibilities for explaining estimates of y < 1 based on reallocations within an industry. For example, suppose high income-elasticities (leading to high procyclicality of inputs) tend to be associated with high price-elasticities of demand (leading to lower steady-state markups, which in turn lead firms to operate at points on their cost curves with lower y). Then the cyclicality of input use covaries negatively with returns to scale.
39 We thank Christopher Foote and Matthew Shapiro for this observation.
VI. Conclusion
We measure aggregate technology by correcting the aggregate Solow residual for the effects of increasing returns, imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation. We find that in the short run, technology improvements significantly reduce input use and nonresidential investment; output changes little. Inputs and nonresidential investment recover sharply and output increases over the next few years.
These results are inconsistent with standard parameterizations of real-business-cycle models, which imply that technology improvements raise input use and nonresidential investment at all horizons. By contrast, we argue that these results are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of DGE models with sticky output prices driven by both technology and monetary shocks. Nevertheless, although technology shocks are not the main cause of cyclical fluctuations, neither are they negligible.
Note that our empirical work actually estimates a composite of the partial effect of a technology improvement and the reactions of policy (especially monetary policy) to that technology shock. If the Federal Reserve tries to stabilize inflation, then the true partial effect is even more contractionary than the total effect that we estimate. This point may be especially relevant for estimating the dynamic effects of technology shocks-if the Fed responds in an expansionary way to a fall in inflation and employment, and if some part of Fed policy and its effects operates with a lag of more than one year, it may appear that the economy recovers more quickly from a technology improvement than would be the case without Fed intervention.
We believe that our paper and the structural VAR literature have identified an important stylized fact: technical progress is contractionary in the short run, but has its expected expansionary effect in the long run. We advance price rigidity as the major reason for the perverse short-run effect of technical improvement, as do Gallf (1999a) and Gali and Rabanal (2005) . (Of course, price rigidity may be due to imperfect information rather than costly price adjustment per se.) The aggregate evidence is broadly consistent with this view, and direct firm-level evidence is provided by Marchetti and Nucci (2005). Nevertheless, it remains possible that other models could be consistent with the evidence as well. Three of the competing explanations are "real inflexibilities" in aggregate demand, sectoral-shifts models, and "cleansing effects" models. We have presented some evidence that these stories do not explain our findings, but additional tests are needed before we can be sure that price inflexibility does explain our results.
Of course, the alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but could all contain an element of the truth. Indeed, estimated DGE models by Levin used growth rates from 1949 to 1958 from the older dataset and growth rates from 1959 to 1996 from the newer dataset. Growth rates for the post-1959 overlap period generally line up closely, particularly in the early years, so there are not major inconsistencies between the two data series around the merge point. In addition, qualitative results are robust to using the two datasets separately.
We generally construct indices and aggregates as Tomrnquist indices. To construct industry input aggregates, however, we use factor shares averaged over the entire sample period, out of concern that observed factor payments might not be allocative period by period, for example, because of implicit contracts. Hence, we take an explicit first-order approximation to the industry production function. We assume that industries earn zero economic profits, so that factor shares sum to one.
Hours per Worker
Where available, we used BLS data on hours/ worker for production workers. Where necessary, particularly in early years of the sample, we used supplemental employment and hours data provided by Dale Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh to construct a long time series for each industry. We then detrended log hours-perworker using Christiano and Terry J. Fitzgerald's (2003) band pass filter, isolating frequency components between two and eight years. By detrending, our utilization series has zero mean and no trend. We then took the first-difference in this detrended series as our measure of hoursper-worker growth dh. Burnside (1996) , and others. Following Burnside (1996) , we measure monetary policy as innovations to the three-month Treasury Bill rate from a VAR with GDP, the GDP deflator, an index of commodity prices, the three-month T-Bill rate, and M1.42 Government Spending.-We sum the quarterly growth rates of real government defense spending from the preceding year, i.e., from the fourth quarter of t -2 to the fourth quarter of t -1, as the instrument for annual input growth from year t -1 to year t. Petroleum Prices.-Following Knut Mork (1989), we use the "composite" refiner acquisition price (RAP) for crude oil, a series produced by the Department of Energy. The composite price is refiners' average purchase price of crude oil, i.e., the appropriate weighted average of the domestic and foreign prices per barrel. Conceptually, the major difference between RAP and the PPI for crude petroleum arises from the Nixon price controls imposed in the second half of 1971.43 RAP is available annually from 1968 and monthly from January 1974 on. We follow Mork (1989) in linking the PPI and the annual composite RAP to create an estimated quarterly refiner acquisition price prior to 1974. Following James D. Hamilton (1996), we measure the quarterly oil price "shock" as the difference between the log of the quarterly real oil price and the maximum oil price in the preceding four quarters. (In all cases, we measure the quarterly oil price using the last month of the quarter.) We then use the sum of the quarterly shocks in the preceding calendar year as our instrument.
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